Investment-driven growth has long been regarded as a key development strategy in China. This paper investigates empirically the validity of this view. Post-1990 data analyses and macroeconometric model simulations show that market demand has become a regular force in driving investment since reforms, that non-demand-driven investment growth contributes to increasing capital-output ratio far more than output growth, that government investment exerts a pivotal role in amplifying investment cycles, albeit effective in promoting employment, and that delayed and rising consumption from current investment surge can help sustain the impact of growth even with constant-returns-to-scale in the long-run GDP.
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By three methods we may learn wisdom: first, by reflection, which is noblest; second, imitation, which is easiest; and third by experience, which is the bitterest.
Confucius

I. Another East Asian 'Miracle'?
The spectacular growth of China over the last two decades apparently adds significant force to the East Asian 'Miracle'.
1 During the period 1990 -2003, China's growth has been averaging 9.3% in terms of GDP per annum while the accompanying rate in gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) is 14% and the rate of the total investment in fixed assets (TIFA) is 15%. 2 Today, GFCF accounts for over 40% of nominal GDP, as compared to less than 30% in the early 1980s, see Table 1 .1. These records have definitely outperformed those of Japan and the US and many other Newly Industrialized Asian Economies (NIAEs), see In 2004, the startling acceleration of the TIFA -43.2% growth in the 1 st quarter and 33.3% in the 2 nd quarter 3 before settling down to 27.6% for the full year -has led the Chinese government to curtail fixed assets investment out of the grave concern that the rising investment would overheat the economy. The rapid investment expansion has caused severe shortage in energy and raw material supplies, pushed imports to grow faster than exports, and accelerated inflation. The investment price index rose to 5.6% and the 1 The East Asian 'Miracle' refers to the myth that the engine driving economic growth is essentially capital accumulation instead of total factor productivity growth, see e.g. (Young 1995) and (Senhadji 2000) . 2 The TIFA is more often used than the GFCF in China, as it is published monthly and more timely than GFCF. Both GFCF and TIFA are deflated by the price index of fixed assets from the China Statistical Yearbook 2004 for the period 1991-2003. The price index of raw materials and energy is used for 1990 as the price index of fixed assets is unavailable that year. 3 All the statistics quoted are y-o-y rates.
2 consumer price index to 3.9% in 2004 as compared to 2.2% and 1.2% respectively in 2003.
However, GDP growth ended up at about the same level as 2003 in spite of the investment fever and the tightening of investment policies.
The view that the Chinese economy is an investment-driven economy is a legacy from the old regime of a centrally planned economy (CPE), e.g. see (Kornai 1980 ) for a general theory of investment hunger of a CPE and see (Imai 1994) for an investment-led business cycle model of China. And in spite of regime changes since the reforms, capital investment has remained to be regarded as a vital factor to promote the economic growth, as discernible from the recent literature. For example, Goldstein and Lardy (2004) anticipate that it will take a few years for the Chinese economy to unwind the current investment boom, possibly with a down turn, on the basis of the present investment curb. This investment-driven growth view also finds support in a number of empirical studies, e.g. see (Yu 1998) , (Kwan et al 1999) , and Zhang (2003) .
However, the view that investment is the main engine of growth faces several problems. Considering that the Chinese economy has undergone enormous changes since the reform, can we find enough evidence to support the assertion that the old investmentdriven mechanism is still intact? If the Chinese economy has remained in an investment-led track, why is it that the rate of GDP growth has always been significantly lower than the rate of investment growth over the last 15 years? 4 Why has the volatile investment cycles not discernibly affected the GDP growth path, as shown from Figure 1 .2? If one seeks support of the view from levels rather than growth rates, how can we explain the visible increasing GFCF/GDP ratio, as shown in More fundamentally, one needs first to clearly define the investment-driven growth view as the investment-output nexus is by no means a one-way causal relationship according to endogenous growth theories.
The paper makes an empirical attempt to answer the above problems using post-1990
time-series data. We try to do this first by careful data analysis, see section 2. We then try to assess empirically the magnitude and the manner by which investment drives economic growth and vice versa. This we will do using a quarterly macro-econometric model of China where both investment and GDP are endogenously determined, see Section 3.
Concluding remarks are in Section 4.
II. What do data tell us about the investment-GDP nexus?
In this section, we try to find answers to the questions posed in the previous section and to examine all the possibly identifiable aspects of the investment-driven-growth view with respect to aggregate investment and GDP data. Specifically, we to try to explain why surges in investment have not been significantly transmitted into GDP surges -whether it is investment growth or GDP growth which is dynamically leading the other, whether there 5 Evidence of overinvestment has also been presented in a number of recent publications, e.g. see (Zhang 2003) , (Lin 2004) and (Wolf 2005). 4 exists simultaneous causality between the two aggregates in levels, and whether there has been significant technological progress underlying the long-term growth.
Let us first try to answer the question why the investment surge has not been significantly transmitted into GDP surge by analyzing the co-movement of the demand components of GDP with respect to the GFCF changes. Denote real GDP by Y, real consumption (including both private and government) by C, net exports by NX and inventory (or change in stocks) by IS. The income identity can thus be presented as
The corresponding growth equation is:
(1) Figure 2.1 presents the weighted growth rates of the four components in the above equation alongside GDP growth rates using annual data for the period 1993-2003. It is discernible from the figure that the four component rates move in a closely substitutive manner such that their weighted average, i.e. the GDP growth rate, could remain at a relatively stable level. When GFCF accelerates, it squeezes either consumption, net exports or inventory which is very evident in recent years. There is a strong contemporaneous offsetting relationship among the GDP components to cushion the volatility impact of a single component on GDP, which is often neglected by analyses of the investment-GDP nexus based solely on the production side of the GDP.
However, the above analysis is comparative static in nature and therefore cannot answer the question of whether GDP growth is dynamically led by investment growth or vice versa. To answer this question, we employ the commonly used method of Granger causality test, e.g. see Blomström et al (1996) and Ball et al (1996) . Ball et al (1996) and Blomstrom et al (1996) Let us now examine whether the two pairs of variables are also contemporaneously interdependent. A simple two-equation VAR (vector autoregression) system is set up for this purpose. A SEM is then specified within the VAR and estimated first using ML estimator and then single-equation OLS estimators. These results enhance the inferences based on the Granger causality test, and provide strong support to the claim that the Chinese economy is already out of the old investmentled growth regime.
The view of investment-driven growth also faces the theoretical challenge that longterm growth is independent of capital accumulation, unless there exist either increasing returns to scale due to capital or technological progress. Empirical evidence shows that increasing returns to capital is normally long-run untenable, see e.g. (Temple 1999) . To examine whether there has been significant technological progress underlying China's economic growth, we utilize the long-run GDP equation proposed by , which assumes that the long-run GDP follow a simple Cobb-Douglas production function with constant returns to scale. If there were significant technological progress, the actual GDP de-trended by this long-run GDP should carry a visible upward trend. The actual GDP, the long-run GDP and the de-trended GDP are plotted in Figure 2 .2. Interestingly, the de-trended GDP shows a slow cycle, with a significant downward movement since the late 1990s, corresponding to the noticeable rise in the GFCF/GDP ratio as shown in Table   1 .1. Thus, we do not reject the constant return to scale assumption -long-run economic growth may not be dependent upon investment growth.
III. What does macroeconometric model tell us about the investment-GDP nexus?
The data evidence of the previous section shows that in comparative static terms, there are counterbalancing demand factors that offset the impact of investment volatility on GDP; that, in the long run, there has not been discernable trend of long-lasting technological progress to reject the constant return to scale condition; and that there is 8 fairly strong evidence of simultaneity between investment and GDP although the causal direction in terms of growth rates is more of GDP → investment than vice versa. However, examination of data alone is inadequate for us to synthesize the above results and to evaluate how much and in what way investment drives GDP growth both in the short run and in the long run. To achieve these, one has to resort to the use of macro models.
A common type of macro model for this purpose is the endogenous or semiendogenous growth model, see (George et al 2003) for a recent survey and ( As the investment-GDP nexus is the present focus, this entails a brief description of the investment block and the output block of the model. 8 There are four key equations in this 9 block: the first three equations explain government budgetary investment, business sector investment, and foreign direct investment (FDI) respectively, and the last equation links aggregate investment (i.e. the sum of government budgetary investment, business sector investment and FDI) to GFCF in the GDP expenditure composition. Capital stock is derived from GFCF. As for the output block, GDP is explained via its three sectors: the primary sector, the secondary sector and the tertiary sector. Theoretically, the investment-output nexus can be summarized as follows: the expected output, e t Y , depends on both supply and demand factors:
where K and L represent capital and labor input respectively, and Φ denotes demand factors. The expected investment, e t I , is dependent upon factor input demand and other institutional factors, Ψ:
where ∆ denotes difference, δ is the depreciation rate, and P K and P Y are the prices of capital and output respectively. Qin and Song (2003) show that (3) can be derived from minimizing the cost of an aggregate production function, where the cost function is augmented by soft-budget constraints to characterize institutional features related to government investment decisions. find that changes in government investment exert important institutional impact on business sector investment even though the latter now follows closely the standard capital input demand theory in the long run.
Two issues are in need of clarification with equation (2). First, it does not contain an explicit technological progress factor. This is due to two reasons. One is data evidence, i.e. the lack of observable long-run trend shown in Figure 2 .2 of the previous section. The other is the lack of robust empirical evidence identifying total factor productivity, see e.g. (Chen 1997) , (Easterly and Levine 2002) and (Carlaw and Lipsey 2003) . One alternative is to endogenize technological progress with respect to capital, as widely adopted in endogenous growth theories. For example, King and Robson (1993) assume that it is a nonlinear function of I t . Since the dynamics of I t is adequately incorporated in the econometric specification of the equations corresponding to (3), our model has not ruled out the possibility of investment-led technological changes. 10 The second issue is concerned with the feasibility of a production function dominant output equation to explain the output of the three sectors individually. Apart from data unavailability with respect to disaggregate capital inputs, it is questionable whether output of services is dominantly supply driven. In the China model, only the secondary sector follows a long-run production function. The other two sectors are explained mainly from the demand side, considering that labor input does not serve as a constraint to either sector. A more detailed sketch of the output block, as well as the investment block of the China model is given in Figure 3 .1.
In general, structural equations of the parsimonious error-correction model (ECM) type are obtained on the basis of (2) and (3) via the dynamic specification approach, see (Hendry 1995) . Most of the variables are in natural logarithm and the variable set, {x}, is divided into endogenous variables, y, and non-modeled variables, z:
The growth rate of capital stock is found to exert a small, positive role in the secondary sector output equation of the current the China model.
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where d denotes a set of dummy variables including the constant term and seasonal dummies, n denotes the minimum lag to make the residual term, u t , white noise, and where a priori theory, such as (2) and (3), is embedded in the long-run error/equilibrium term,
In order to find out how investment and output drive each other dynamically within a macro model comprised of mainly estimated equations of the type like (4), we resort to the method of impulse response function (IRF) , e.g. see (Dungey and Pagan 2000) . The IRF method exploits the equivalence between (4) and a moving average representation in terms of the error term, u. When an econometric model is built to comprise mainly of structural equations, the error term associated with a structural equation is often interpreted as the 'structural' shock to the endogenous variable of that equation, e.g. see (Wickens and Motto 2001) . This enables applied modelers to use IRF to trace how every single endogenous variable in a model reacts to a random shock associated with one particular endogenous variable. When a macro-econometric model contains more than a few behavioral equations, it is virtually impossible to solve the IRFs analytically. It is then common to get the IRFs via model simulation. In particular, the IRF for n periods, using the estimated model, M , with respect to a shock from the ith equation to the jth variable is defined as:
where the impulse shock, δ, is commonly taken as the estimated standard deviation of u i .
Two technical issues are disregarded in our IRF simulations due to model-size induced technical complexity. The first is residual orthogonalization. The structural interpretation of a shock depends on the condition that the error term concerned should be uncorrelated with the error terms of other relevant structural equations. Instead of orthogonalizing the huge 12 residual matrix of the model, we simply check the sample covariance of those residuals relevant to our IRF simulations. In most cases, the covariance is negligibly small. The second issue is estimating confidence intervals for the IRFs. Although various methods are available, it is practically infeasible for us to implement them on a model of this size.
Three sets of IRFs are simulated to examine how much investment shocks impact on the output. The first corresponds to a government budgetary investment shock, the second to the business sector investment shock and the third to the combined shocks of the first two. The results of IRFs relating to the major variables are illustrated in Figures 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4 respectively. In these figures, all the level variables are divided by population, which is exogenous in the model to facilitate the interpretation of the simulation results with respect to growth theories.
Several interesting observations can be made out of these IRF graphs. First, there is a visible, though very small, lasting output gain from one-off investment shocks. Roughly, a 10% one-off increase in GFCF generates around 0.05% long-term GDP growth (see the average as well as the end-of-sample value of GDPc in Figure 3.4) . Second, the growth is predominantly from the secondary sector (i.e. GDP growth path closely follows secondary sector growth path), followed by a rising tertiary sector output. The primary sector enjoys the least growth from the investment shocks. Third, the increase in the output of the tertiary sector is accompanied by a decline in unemployment and a subsequent rise in private consumption, implying certain long-term welfare gain of the shocks. This also shows that the long-term growth effect can be sustained by enhanced, though delayed, demand factors, even in the absence of technological progress (i.e. the graphs in the bottom right panels of 13 these figures show no discernible upward movement to indicate technological progress) 11 . Fourth, government investment plays a pivotal role in the increase in output even though its one-off increase is roughly equivalent to 0.4% GFCF shock, its long-term output impact is as large as a 9.4% GFCF shock from the business sector investment. This is because an increase in government investment signals expansionary fiscal policy to the economy, invoking stronger growth in GFCF in the subsequent years (see Figure 3. 2). Since the increase in private consumption appears to play a crucial role in sustaining the long-term GDP growth in the above scenarios, we experiment on a scenario where the initial shock comes from private consumption in order to see if such a shock has similar growth effect, see Figure 3 .5. It is discernible from the IRFs in Figure 3 .5 that the answer is negative. A one-off increase in private consumption exerts no permanent effect on GDP growth. This is not very surprising though as a one-off consumption increase does not have the cumulative effect that a one-off investment increase has via capital stock.
Next, we simulate four sets of IRFs to output shocks. The first three sets correspond to an impulse shock of the primary sector, the secondary sector and the tertiary sectors respectively. The last set corresponds to combined shocks of these three sectors. The IRFs of GFCF as well as the government investment and business investment are plotted in Figure 3 .6. In order to make the effects comparable across sectors, we normalized the effects of sectoral shocks in Figure 3 .6 by converting each sector shock into an equivalent 14 1% GDP growth shock.
12 Notice that the output shocks virtually have no permanent effect on investment. More interestingly, the volatilities that the output shocks induce on investment variables are far smaller than those induced by investment shocks on output variables. In particular, the primary sector is the sector that invokes the largest output-led temporary investment spikes among the three sectors, whereas the temporary output rise in the secondary and the tertiary sectors even results in negative investment demand in the long run. In other words, only the agricultural sector appears relatively in need of further investment. This is mainly due to the fact that nominal responses to each shock differ across sectors because of different implicit impact on the three sectoral deflators, which transmits onto various prices and interest rates. Figure 3 .7 illustrates these differences embodied in inflation (both in terms of consumer price and investment price indices), nominal and real lending rates. It is discernible from the figure that agriculture is the only sector whose shock dampens the real lending rate to stimulate investment. Taken as a whole, the simulation results suggest that output-led investment is far more efficient than autonomous investment rises if judged on the basis of relative incremental changes of investment versus output growth. In other words, if investment depends purely on factor input demand as shown in equation (2), less investment would be needed to sustain the growth. The existing capacity in the economy appears to have room for further growth without investment growth, e.g. see similar views by Wolf (2005) .
The IRF results clearly show why the recent investment boom in China has not been transmitted into the country's GDP growth and why GDP growth has been more or less 12 After the normalization, the primary sector impulse shock generates roughly a 5% temporary rise and 0.25% permanent rise in GFCF; the secondary sector shock generates roughly a 2% temporary rise and 0.1% permanent fall in GFCF; the tertiary sector shock generates 2% temporary rise and 0.04% permanent fall in GFCF.
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immune to investment fevers. It also substantiates the data evidences presented in the previous section. 
IV. Conclusions
This paper assesses empirically the validity of the belief that the Chinese economy still follows largely the investment-led growth paradigm. The paradigm is scrutinized from several aspects of the investment-output nexus: the lead-lag relationship between the growth rates of the pair, the simultaneity and long-run interdependency between the pair in levels, and the combined long-run and short-run interactions between them when both are endogenized within a macroeconometric model. The effects of investment are considered not only as GFCF flows but also as cumulated capital stock. Furthermore, the nexus is examined at a disaggregate level by means of impulse response function analysis of a macroeconometric model. Specifically, the dynamics of the nexus is examined through the impacts of random shocks via government budgetary investment, business sector investment, as well as three output sectors.
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The data analyses and model simulations yield a number of interesting results with important policy implications:
1. Empirical results show the existence of a long-run positive relationship between investment and economic growth, but the causality runs from the latter to the former. In other words, the growth of capital stock and/or growth of investment does not lead or exogenously drive output growth regularly either in short run or in long run. Rather, it is output that drives investment demand in the economy. This implies the applicability of market-based growth theories.
2. Analysis of the long-run GDP trend shows that the Chinese economy has not been an exception to the East Asian 'miracle', in the sense that there lacks evidence of noticeably long-lasting technological progress to refute the constant return to scale condition in the long run. Indeed, rapid investment growth has resulted in rising capital-output ratio rather than output growth acceleration -another reason why investment is not really driving growth. Note: indicates growth rate. Statistics in parentheses are standard errors while those in brackets are probabilities. Those marked by '*' are significant at 5% level. F-statistic indicates no granger-causality between GFCF growth and GDP growth or capital growth and GDP growth. GDP growth marginally granger-causes capital growth (the significant level is 5.5%).
Table 2.2 Dickey-Fuller (DF) and Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit-root tests
Full sample
Sub-sample DF [-2.92 at 5%] ADF(3) [-2.93 at 5%] DF [-2.94 at 5%] ADF(3) [-2.94 GFCF is not significant to GDP in set 1. Capital is significant to GDP in set 2 with different coefficients for the simultaneous and OLS models implying interdependence with GDP. GDP is however found to be weakly exogenous to investment (set 1) and capital (set 2). 0% 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 GDPc GFCFc TIFAc
Data source: See the Appendix. 
